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Background: The Shanshucao landslide is a bedding landslide in the Three Gorges Reservoir. This landslide had not
been subject to obvious deformation in the past, nor had it been included in the list of geologic hazards previously
identified in the Three Gorges Reservoir.
Findings: The Shanshucao slope failed at 13:19 p.m. on Sep. 2, 2014, during which the northern soil mass
slid rotationally on a plane under traction produced by the rocky bedding landslide to the south. The Daling
Hydropower Station was situated on the Shanshucao landslide, and power generation pipelines feeding the station
began leaking four hours before the incident. Heavy rainfall, fluctuation of water level in the reservoir, and leakage
of tunnel pipelines caused a sharp increase of hydraulic uplift pressure within the slope. This was the key trigger of
the incident.
Conclusion: Before the incident, members of the public reported timely clues on slope deformation, and landslide
specialists and governmental officials made prompt collaborative decisions that contributed to a successful
emergency evacuation of the landslide site. As a consequence, all residents living on the slope evacuated
successfully before the occurred. This successful case of emergency landslide evacuation provides guidance for
dealing with unexpected geologic hazards in the Three Gorges Reservoir, and in other disaster-prone regions
world-wide.
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Emergency survey show that the Shanshucao landslide is
a bedding landslide, the northern soil mass slipped rota-
tionally on a plane under traction produced by the rocky
bedding landslide to the south. Heavy rainfall, raise of
water level in the reservoir, and leakage of tunnel pipe-
lines inside the slope caused a sharp increase of hy-
draulic uplift pressure within the slope. This was the key
trigger of the landslide. Members of the public reported
timely clues on slope deformation, and landslide special-
ists and governmental officials made prompt collabora-
tive decisions that contributed to a successful emergency* Correspondence: bolinhuang@aliyun.com
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provided the original work is properly creditedevacuation of this landslide. The MEWNG shows its
powerful ability to deal with emergency landslide.
Introduction
The Three Gorges Project stands as the largest hydropower
engineering in the world, Since the 1950s, when experts
first argued for its development, extensive efforts have been
made on investigation, survey, prevention, and control of
geologic hazards. The geohazards in the Three Gorges
Reservoir are characterized by their extensive distibution,
considerable influence, and high activity. To combat these
features, the Three Gorges Reservoir has seen the estab-
lishment of a monitoring and early warning network of
geohazards known as MEWNG. This network is composed
of observations from the local people, an established pre-
paredness system, a professional monitoring system, and
an information management and early warning commandicle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
hich permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
.
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the efforts of the local people, geohazard specialists, and
governmental officials. Slope information collected from
periodic monitoring is reported to the specialists by the
local populace, providing clues to work efficiently, and to
draw firmly-based conclusions. Government officials then
make decisions based on this information. This system
radically broadens the vision of the geohazard specialists,
and increases the scientific basis of government emer-
gency response decisions. The MEWNG has been shown
to be effective in dealing with unexpected landslides,
as demonstrated by previous examples in the Xintan
landslide and the Wangxia rockfall (Luo 1986, Wang
1996, Le et al. 2011).
The Shanshucao slope is located in Zigui County in
Three Gorges Reservoir. It is a newborn bedding landslide,
which failed on Sep. 2, 2014. This landslide has aroused
considerable concern, as it destroyed a small local hydro-
power station. This was the first instance of significant
damage to a hydropower station in the Three Gorges Res-
ervoir from landslide. Fortunately, no casualties or injuries
occurred, due to prompt evacuation before the failure. This
was a successful case of geohazard emergency response in
the Three Gorges Reservoir, facilitated by the MEWNG
system. This paper describes the landslide process, the trig-
gering factors involved, and the successful operation of
MEWNG, providing guidance for emergency responses to
unexpected geohazards in the Three Gorges Reservoir, and
in other regions around the world.
An overview of the Shanshucao slope
The Shanshucao slope is located in Shazhenxi Town, on
the left bank of the Luogudong River, a tributary of the
Qinggan River in the Three Gorges Reservoir (Fig. 1). The
landslide is only 300 m away from Shazhenxi Town. The
Qianjiangping slope, which is situated along the Qinggan
River, lies on the northwest of the Shanshucao slope.Fig. 1 Location map of the Shanshucao slope. Inset shows the relative locaThe Shanshucao slope is situated downstream of Daling
Village, and can be divided into two parts according to the
composition of its shallow materials. The southern part is
composed primarily of bedded bedrock, whereas the
northern is covered by a 1–10 m thickness of soil.
Lithologically, the bedrock belongs to the Niejiashan For-
mation of Jurassic Age (J2n), which consists mainly of
greyish-green thickly-bedded sandstones in its upper part,
and purple to red medium-bedded sandstones interbed-
ded with silty mudstones in its lower part. In this area the
Niejiashan Formation has a strike of 115° and a dip of 20°.
The soil mass is composed mostly of eluvium consisting
of sandstone gravels. With a bedding structure, the slope
aspect is 105°, and the average slope angle is 21°, similar
to the dip of the bedrock. Vegetation is extensively devel-
oped on the slope. The rocky slope is mainly covered by
cedar trees, whereas the soil slope is occupied by citrus
trees. A small platform is present at an elevation of 300 m.
The top of the slope lies at an elevation of 425 m,
where it forms a divide between the Qinggan and
Luogudong Rivers.
As shown in Fig. 2, National Road G348 passes the slope
area. This is the nearest traffic artery connecting Yichang
City to Shazhenxi Town and Badong County. More im-
portantly, a small hydropower station named the Daling
Hydropower Station was situated within the slope area.
The Daling Hydropower Station was a diversion hydro-
power station with an installed capacity of 1,000 KW, and
was built in 2008. The main buildings of the hydropower
station lay the slope, along with a 5-storey dormitory, a
300 m2 workshop, pressure pipes, and an impounding
forebay. More than 20 people were resident at the hydro-
power station. Water used by the hydropower station was
sourced from an upstream gully, and was derived from
the Luogudong River. The water was delivered by tunnel
pipelines, and flowed through the Daling slope before
reaching the impounding forebay on the Shanshucaotion between the Shanshucao landslide and the Three Gorges Dam
Fig. 2 Aerial view of the Shanshucao slope before failure (taken in
July, 2014). Red dotted lines delineate the extent of the landslide
Fig. 3 Photographs of leakagess from the pressure pipes. The up
photo was taken at 12:53 p.m., when only one side was leaking a
small amount of water. The photograph at end was taken at
12:59 p.m., when the pipes were leaking a significant volume of
water on both sides
Huang et al. Geoenvironmental Disasters  (2015) 2:18 Page 3 of 9slope, from which it was pumped into the pressure pipes
for power generation.
As specified in relevant Chinese laws, prudent site selec-
tion and environmental impact assessment must be
conducted prior to commencing construction of any
hydropower station. Site selection and subsequent con-
struction of the Daling Hydropower Station therefore
meant it was recognized as stable by many experts. Conse-
quently, this slope was not included in the database of
local geohazards, as it was assumed to be safe. Although
there had been no visible deformation in the Shanshucao
slope in the past, the orientation of the Shanshucao slope
and dip of the basement offered potential for structural
sliding. This slope could thus be regarded as an over-
looked potential landslide. This potential was realized by
the Shanshucao landslide, which occurred quite suddenly
at 13:19 p.m. on Sept. 2, 2014.
Landslide process & emergency disposal process
The forebay channels in the Daling Hydropower Station
started to seep at about 9:00 a.m. on Sep. 2, 2014, and the
pressure pipes cracked and leaked. However, no deform-
ation was observed on the ground nearby at that time. The
head of the hydropower station immediately contacted the
chief engineer (one of the authors of this paper) of geo-
logical hazards in the Land and Resources Bureau of Zigui
County to seek professional assistance, hoping the cause of
the leakage could be established. At around 12:30 a.m., the
chief engineer carried out an initial investigation of the
channel seepage and pipe leakage, accompanied by officials
from the Shazhenxi Government. During this investigation,
the leakage increased abruptly, changing from seeping to
jetting (Fig. 3). This change suggested that the pressure
pipes had deformed more seriously, resulting in larger
cracks. Meanwhile, a considerable volume of underground
water flowed out in the upstream reaches, at an elevation
of 180 m a.s.l. (the spring shown in Fig. 2,), with a flow
diameter of 12 cm, and a high flow rate. At this stage, novisible deformation had been observed on the slope nearby
the pressure pipes, or on National Highway G348.
At around 13:05 p.m., it was concluded from preliminary
investigation that the forebay and tunnel pipelines had been
destroyed by deformation of the slope, resulting in penetra-
tion of a considerable volume of water into the slope; this
water then seeped through rock mass fissures. Intensified
deformation and abrupt outflow of underground water sug-
gested that the slope was actively deforming. At that time,
more and more visible fractures appeared in the south side
of the Highway G348, and the northern road began to
bulge intactly, indicating that global deformation as occur-
ring. In light of the requirements of the MEWNG in the
Three Gorges Reservoir, and after discussion with the
geological engineers on-site, the heads of the Shazhenxi
Government took the following emergency measures:
1) immediate shut-down of the far-end (uphill) water
pumping system to cut off the water flow into the
slope; 2) informed the power supply authorities to sus-
pend power supply, to prevent risks associated with
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zones based on geomorphic conditions, and assign the
incident with an orange alert level (inferior only to the
red alert level represented by intense deformation); 4)
promptly organize all the residents to evacuate from
the area, and close all relevant roads in the area; 5)
dispatch two technical groups to conduct emergency
investigations and to delineate the extent of the land-
slide: one group was responsible for observing deform-
ation on the lateral margin along Highway G348, while
the other was sent to observe deformation of the upper
slope along the Dengjiawang Road and at higher eleva-
tion, to locate the head of the landslide.
As instructed by the above emergency response plan,
the Daling Hydropower Station staff, nearby residents,
and the students and staff of Shazhenxi Middle School all
evacuated promptly from the alert zone (Fig. 4). Thanks
to the effectiveness of previous emergency evacuation
drills in the case of geohazards, all 524 students and staff
from the school had evacuated within 5 min. A total of
over 950 persons had evacuated the classified alert zone
within 15 min of the evacuation instruction being issued.
At 13:19 a.m., the slope slid rapidly as a whole. At
this time, the technicians dispatched to the peak were
still on the Daling slope, but had not arrived at the
head of the landslide, and fortunately they escaped in-
jury. The Shanshucao slope slid for approximately
2 min or so, with a loud crash and emission of a cloud
of dust. Sporadic rockfalls were observed at the lateral
margin and trailing edge of the slope following the
main sliding.
After the landslide, a prompt emergency investigation
was organized to determine whether the landslide would
tend to expand, and movement resume. Meanwhile, the
governmental officials sent relevant personnel to checkFig. 4 Alert zones defined in the emergency response. The red lines deline
lines delineate the alert zones before the collapse. No residents live on the
excluded from the alert zonewhether there was anyone had been injured or killed by
the landslide. By 14:15 p.m., the officials had ascertained
that there had been no injuries or fatalities, and they then
adjusted the landslide alert level to red. Under a red alert,
the landslide is regarded as being under intense deform-
ation, landslide hazard could threat to the safety of life and
property around the immediate area of the slide in the next
24 hours, and crowd and traffic control should be carried
out for at least the next 24 hours. At 14:16 p.m., the chief
engineer reported this landslide incident to superiors in
the technical management agency, the Bureau of Land Re-
sources of Yichang City, and the Geo-Hazard Command
Center of the Three Gorges Reservoir, and also requested
additional technical support. A fully-automated displace-
ment monitor was then installed to perform monitoring
on the landslide mass and its surrounding areas. In the
meantime, many experts rushed to the site to examine
deformation of the landslide. At this stage, the profes-
sional monitoring and consultation phase of the land-
slide had begun.Losses associated with the landslide
Figure 5 shows a panoramic view of the Shanshucao
slope after the collapse. The landslide had destroyed the
entire Daling Hydropower Station, including three build-
ings and workshops, along with various pipelines. The
forebay, powerhouse, and the transmission and supply
equipment were all destroyed or buried. National Road
G348 was cut, and a 200 m long segment destroyed,
along with a 450 m length of village and town roads. A
20 hectares citrus orchard was damaged to varying ex-
tent, of which 4.05 hectares were completely destroyed.
The supply lines of 3 power supply sub-stations were
damaged, 27 utility poles were destroyed, and someate the actual extent of the landslide range, and the dotted orange
opposite bank of the Luogudong River, and that hence that area is
Fig. 5 Panoramic view of the Shanshucao slope after failure (taken on Sept. 4). No remanents of the hydropower station can be seen in the ruins
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are estimated to be 5.19 million US dollars.
Landslide features
An intensive field survey was conducted after Shanshucao
slope failed. The elevation of the head of the landslide was
285 m, the toe of the suface of rupture of the landslide lay
at an elevation of 180 m, and the toe of the landslide slidFig. 6 Sketch map of the Shanshucao landslide. Toothed lines are the land
the range of the influence areainto the Luogudong River. The elevation of the water level
on the day of the landslide was 162.3 m a.s.l. The area of
the bedrock slide zone was 15,500 m2, and that of the soil
mass slide zone 9,300 m2, giving a total area of the land-
slide of almost 25,000 m2. The form of the landslide was
tongue-shaped, with a length of about 350 m and width of
80–120 m (Fig. 6). The soil mass slide zone had a thick-
ness of 1–10 m, averaging 5 m. Based on the heightslide cliff, the red lines are major cracks, and the dashed red lines are
Fig. 7 Photograph of the crack trough between the rocky slide
mass and the southern flank cliff
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zone is calculated to be 25–30 m. Therefore, it is esti-
mated that the volume of the landslide was about
465,000 m3.
The slide of the rocky mass caused the formation of ten-
sion cracks around the rocky slide mass (Fig. 7). The
width of the southern flank crack is about 12–23 m, with
a length of 260 m, and is approximately U-shaped. A large
number of rock blocks accumulated in its bottom part.
The tension crack between the rocky slide mass and the
soil mass is V-shaped, and has an average width of 1–3 m
(Fig. 8). According to presence of G348 road debris and
the position of the crown crack, the sliding distance of the
rocky mass was about 117 m. The sliding distance of the
soil mass decreases as it extends to the north. On the
northern boundary of the landslide, retaining wall B was
cut into two parts, with a horizontal displacement of
11.9 m, and a vertical displacement of 3.5 m (Fig. 6).
The general sliding direction of the Shanshucao landslide
was about 105°. Because of the blockage of ridge, the direc-
tion of the rocky slide mass shifted from 105° to 75° around
the zone of the foot (Fig. 10). According to the observedFig. 8 Photograph of the crack trough between the rocky slide
mass and the northern slide mass, and the soil slide cliff created by
the soil mass slideslide time of about 2 minutes and the maximum sliding dis-
tance of about 117 m, based on Newton’s Laws of Motion
it can be simply estimated that the maximum speed of
movement of the rocky landslide was about 2 m/s.
The rocky sliding mass exhibits the representative char-
acteristics of translational slide, such as an intact slide mass
and wide tension cracks. The structure interbeded soft and
hard layers is also prone to translational sliding. The soil
cliff and the reduction of sliding distance in the soil mass
part of the slide shows that the soil mass was drawn to slide
by the lateral traction of the rocky sliding mass. The
translational slide of the rocky mass led the lateral soil
mass to rotationally slide on the surface of rupture.
According to subsequent detailed surveys, the lithology
of the rocky sliding zone was brittle and thinly-bedded
silty mudstone, which is also very smooth to the touch
(Fig. 9). The surface of the rupture of the soil mass is
sandstone, which also crops out immediately adjacent
to the landslide (Fig. 10).Trigger mechanism of the landslide
As the northern soil mass was drawn by the traction of the
southern rocky sliding mass, only the trigger mechanism of
the southern rocky mass is discussed here.
Water level fluctuation in the toe of the landslide
produced by regulation of the Three Gorges Reservoir
was naturally considered to be the trigger of the land-
slide. Due to onset of the seasonal autumn floods,
water level in the reservoir fluctuates significantly.
Fig. 11 shows the changes in water level over the period
from Aug. 13, 2014 to Sep. 13, 2014. Water level rose
by 3.8 m between 8:00 am, Sep. 1 and 8:00 am, Sep. 2.
A rise of this magnitude is unprecedented. The failure
was probably triggered by the direct reduction in nor-
mal load within the toe of the slope and dynamic hy-
draulic pressure of underground water caused by the
rising water level (Wang et al. 2004, Singh et al. 2012).Fig. 9 Photograph of the silty mudstone of the potential slide surface
Fig. 10 Weathered surface of the preexisting sandstone layer, 20 m
from the northern boundary of the landslide
Fig. 12 Precipitation recorded at Shazhenxi Town between
August 1st, 2014 and September 10, 2014
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rain fell from Aug. 27 to Sept. 2, and maximum rainfall oc-
curred on Sep. 2, with a 24 hour fall of 96.5 mm (Fig. 12).
Intense rain may saturate the sliding mass, increase its unit
weight, and decrease its strength (He et al. 2009, Miller
et al. 2009). More importantly in this case, torrential rain
may generate dynamic hydraulic pressure, which would re-
duce the anti-slide force, and increase the slide force.
The toe of the Shashucao slope had been eroded by the
Luogudong River long ago, and hence offered little resist-
ance to sliding. The results of field survey showed that in
addition to four sets of short fresh fracture surfaces in the
southern flank boundary of the landslide, the structural
surface of the cliff is brown, and weathering discoloration
and clay adhered to most of the surface (Fig. 13). This
shows that this flank structural surface was pre-existing.
The lateral boundary offered friction and some tension re-
sistance from the limited residual rock bridge on the south
side, and the soil adjacent to the rock mass on the north
side. However, these resistances were limited.
Under the conditions of intense rain and rapid rise of
the water level, the Shashucao landslide began to deform
slowly. In this case, if there had been no pressure pipe onFig. 11 Daily water level change of the Three Gorges Reservoir between
August 13, 2014 and September 12, 2014the Shashucao slope, the slide perhaps may not have oc-
curred. Gentle deformation of the slope would have gener-
ated deformation of the structure inside the slope. This is
the reason why the forebay and tunnel pipelines deformed.
Once water began to leak leaking from these structures, a
large volume of water could enter the mass, leading to the
great changes of groundwater and forces within the land-
slide mass. The water originally used for power generation
had a high head of pressure and large flow. When entering
into sliding surface through the fissure network, the water
generated high groundwater uplift pressure on the bottom
of the surface of rupture, and finally initiated the rapid
sliding of the slope (Fan et al. 2009, Brönnimann 2011).
The mechanical model for the translational landslide with
intact rocky mass can be simplified as a two-dimensional
longitudinal section, as shown in Fig.14a. The situation of
the landslide after failure is sketched in Fig. 14b.
Discussion
Only several hours elapsed between the appearance of
visible deformation of the Shanshucao slope to the offi-
cial decision to evacuate. The rapid increase of the dis-
placement of the fissure on Highway G348 road was the
main reason which led to the prompt official decision.
Although the detailed boundary of the landslide was not
clear at that stage, the displacement became more larger
and larger in a very short time, which showed that theFig. 13 Lateral view of the Shanshucao Landslide (taken on Sep. 12,
2014). The cliff is the northern flank cliff of the landslide. Black dotted
lines are damaged parts of the rock bridge (fresh exposures)
Fig. 14 Schematic diagram of the mechanical model (a) before the landslide and (b) after the landslide
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fail. Under these conditions, an official decision was
needed to deal with the emergency, without delay. If
routine practice had been followed, by first ascertaining
the scale and extent of landslide, and then making the
official decision, action would have been delayed, and
casualties would almost certainly have resulted.
An early official evacuation decision was also made be-
fore the Qianjiangping landslide (Fig. 1), which occurred in
July 13th, 2003. Between June 27th and July 4th of that year,
fissures appeared in the crown and the middle part of the
Qiangjiangping landslide. In these eight days, the relative
displacement of the fissure reached about 4 ~ 6 cm. The of-
ficial decision of evacuation was at 21:40 p.m in 12th, 2003,
when the ground of the front platform of the Qianjiangping
landslide began to bulge, and loud underground noises
could be heard.
In neither of these two landslides was any professional
monitoring work carried out before they failed. These two
official evacuation decisions were made based on qualitative
judgements of the imminent potential for landslide. These
judgements depended on the experience of the engineering
geologists who were on-site. If professional monitoring data
is available, observation of the acceleration of deformationcan be used to quantitatively evaluate the potential for land-
slide. An example of the use of such data is given by the
Wangxia rockmass which is located in the Wu Gorges of
the Three Gorges Reservior. Acceleration of deformation
was detected by monitoring on 21st Oct, 2010, This data
helped in the successful issuing of a warning before mass
movement occurred.
In short, most official evacuation decisions depend on
informed judgments from engineering geologists, on the
potential for imminent failure of landslides.
Conclusions
A detailed field investigation was made of the Shanshucao
landslide that occurred on Sept. 2, 2014, in the Three
Gorges Reservoir. The process and the mechanism of the
landslide, the factors affecting slope failure, and especially
the emergency evacuation procedure were examined.
Based on fieldwork and analyses, the following conclusions
were reached:
1. Shanshucao landslide is a bedding landslide with a
volume of 465,000 m3. The translational slide of the
rocky mass led the lateral soil mass to slide
rotationally on the surface of rupture. The southern
Huang et al. Geoenvironmental Disasters  (2015) 2:18 Page 9 of 9flank boundary of the rocky mass was a pre-existing
structural plane.
2. Intense rain and rapid raise of water level led the
Shashucao landslide to deform slowly. Leakage of
tunnel pipelines produced a high uplift pressure,
which was the key trigger of the slide.
3. The keys to the successful emergency evacuation of the
Shanshucao landslide lie in timely reports by the local
people, and collaborative decisions made by landslide
specialists and government officials. This landslide
crisis was solved successfully by the MEWNG system
that operates in the Three Gorges Reservoir.
4. Establishment of warning systems similar to MEWNG
is recommended for geological disaster-prone areas
around the world.
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